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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
DEREK ANDREASON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20001014-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred in the Utah Court of Appeals by Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-
3(2)(e)(1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. PRESERVATION OF ISSUES AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss which was made 
at the end of the presentation of the State's case? This issue was preserved for review when 
defendant made his motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the State's case. (Tr.2:89:23-
90:3). The standard of review is a correctness standard. State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120, 125 
(Utah App. 1997), Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 502 (Utah 1996). 
B. Was there sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's verdict where there 
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was no evidence of intent to defraud either the public or an individual? The issue regarding 
lack of intent to defraud was preserved in argument by counsel several times. (Tr.2:.95:16-
25, Tr.3:.244:17-245:24, 246:15-23, 247:9-248:10). When reviewing a bench trial for 
sufficiency of the evidence, a trial court's judgment must be sustained unless it is against the 
clear weight of the evidence, or if we otherwise reach a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made. The issue was preserved in the argument on defendant's motion to 
dismiss, (Tr.2:89:23-100:22), and in argument at the conclusion of the trial. American Fork 
City v. Troy Dale Rothe, 405 Utah Adv. Rep. 55, No. 99083-CA 2000 UT App 277, Spanish 
Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 Ut App 61 paragraph 5, 975 P.2d 501 (Utah App. 1999), Rule 52 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
C. Did the fact that the prosecutor referred to and argued facts never admitted in 
evidence in his opening statement, during argument on defendant's motion to dismiss, and 
in argument at the conclusion of the trial constitute prejudicial error where the trial judge 
referred to, and relied on those facts which were never offered or admitted in making a 
ruling on the case? The issue was preserved in argument by counsel. (Tr.2:97:21-25, 
Tr.3:253:6-9, 253:17-254:2, 254:19-25. Where a prosecutor urges a trier of fact to decide 
a case based on matters outside the evidence it also constitutes plain error. State v. Eldredge, 
113 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah 1989), Although this was a trial to the bench rather than a jury, 
prosecutorial misconduct is an abuse of discretion standard requiring demonstration that the 
prosecutor called attention to matters the trier of fact would not be justified in considering, 
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and demonstration that the error was sufficiently prejudicial that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that in the absence of the error there would be a more favorable result. State v. 
Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925 (Ct. App. 1998). 
D. Did the trial court err in failing to make findings supporting conviction? 
The standard of review is the determination whether the trial court made factual findings on 
all material issues. Failure to make factual findings on material issues is considered 
reversible error and requires a remand. Kinkilla v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233 (Utah 1983), 
Carlton v. Carlton, 756 P.2d 86 (Ct. App. 1988). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The following controlling statutes and rules are contained in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Annotated 58-3a-304 
Utah Code Annotated 58-22-305 
Utah Code Annotated 70A-3-104 
Utah Code Annotated 76-6-501 
Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 81(e) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. This was a criminal action where defendant was originally charged 
with one count of racketeering, three counts of forgery, and a single count of practicing 
architecture without a license. 
Proceedings Below. A preliminary hearing was conducted on this matter on 9 Nov. 1999, 
before the Hon. Kay L. Mclff. (T: 1:1-49). At preliminary hearing Judge Mclff bound all 
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of the charges over, but indicated that the racketeering charge could not be discussed in front 
of the Jury until the evidence was presented at trial. The racketeering charge was later 
dismissed by the State after defendant filed a motion to quash bindover. At trial the three 
forgery counts were consolidated into a single count. The practicing architecture without 
a license charge was dismissed by the State at trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Derek and Dana Andreason construct four, four-plexes in the late 1970's. 
Derek and Dana Andreason constructed four four-plexes on real property they own in Sevier 
County beginning in approximately 1976. (Tr.2:103). On the second, third and fourth four-
plex defendant Derek Andreason assisted with the surveying, and drafting, but Alan Nielson 
was retained as engineer on the project, and John Rowley was the architect. (Tr.2:59, 
Tr.2:61, Tr.2.36)(See exhibits 4-22). 
Derek and Dana Andreason decide to construct an additional four-plex, and submit 
plans to Sevier County. 
In the spring of 1998 Defendant and his wife Dana decide to construct a fifth four-
plex on real property they own which adjoins the units constructed in the late 1970s. In April 
of 1998, defendant submitted plans to John Hicks requesting that they be reviewed. 
(Tr.2:20). Mr. Hicks is a Sevier County building official. (Tr.2:19). The plans submitted 
were in fact the same plans used to construct the units built in the 1970's. (Tr.3:168). (See 
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Exhibit Number 2). Mr. Hicks noticed that the plans were approximately 20 years old. 
(Tr.2:20). Mr. Hicks either called or wrote to Mr. Andreason and indicated that the plans 
were too old, and that they needed to be upgraded. (Tr.2:20). (see exhibit 3). 
Derek Andreason submits a new copy of the plans to Sevier County. 
Mr. Andreason picked up the plans and had a new set printed using modern printing 
techniques. This set was printed from the same original as exhibit number 1, and of exhibit 
30. (Tr.3:173 -176). That original is exhibit number 23. The second set of plans (exhibit 
number 1) was submitted within two weeks. (Tr. 2:20). Mr. Hicks was not sure how the 
second set of plans came to be in his office, but believes that they were dropped off. 
(Tr.2:26), (Tr.2:31). When examining the new set of plans, Mr. Hicks noticed the architect 
had not "wet stamped" the seal. (Tr.2:20). Mr. Hicks told defendant that he could not 
accept the plans. (Tr.2:20-21). Defendant asked if he could pick up the plans. (Tr.2:21:6). 
Mr. Hicks did not do a comparison between the first and second set of plans although they 
bear identical dates. (Tr.2:24, 27), (Tr.2:31). Mr. Hicks also failed to examine exhibit 1 
to see if it is up to code. (Tr.2:32:l 1-14). Alan Nielson the engineer testified that except 
for the printing technique used to produce them, exhibits 1 and 2 are identical. (Tr.2:138-
140). Exhibits 1 and 2 were both printed from exhibit 23. (Tr.2: 144-146). Exhibits 1 and 
2 are identical to exhibit 30. 
Mr. Hicks conducts a limited investigation. 
Prior to telling Mr. Andreason that he could not accept the newly printed 
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plans, Mr. Hicks contacted Josephene Rowley the widow of the architect John Rowley and 
spoke with her. (Tr.2 :22). Mr. Hicks learned that John Rowley died in 1996. 
Exhibits 7, 2, and 30 all contain forged signatures, and a Rowley stamp which was 
not wet stamped. 
At trial Alan Nielson testified that although he did the work represented on exhibit 
1, and was paid by the defendant for doing the work, the signatures on the document are not 
his. (Tr.2:57-59). (Tr.2:61)(Tr.2:63). At trial Mr. Nielsen testified that he believed it was 
John Rowley who forged his [Nielson's] signature. (Tr.2:62) 
Based either on the Nielsen signature or the Rowley stamp, Defendant was convicted 
of a single count of forgery. (The trial court did not set forth any findings of fact or 
conclusions of law, but did make a brief oral statement at the conclusion of trial.) 
During his case in chief, defendant put on substantial and uncontested evidence. The 
summary of this evidence is set forth later in this brief. Except as necessary for clarity the 
facts above are limited to facts in a light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Gordon, 913 
P.2d 350, 351 (Utah 1996). 
Additional relevant facts are included in the argument sections. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. At the conclusion of the State's evidence the defendant made a motion to 
dismiss. Defendant has marshaled the evidence which was before the court at the conclusion 
of the State's case. At that point in the trial the State's evidence consisted of evidence that 
-6-
Appellant (hereinafter defendant or Mr. Andreason), submitted a twenty year old set of plans 
to Sevier County. (Exhibit 2). John Hicks a Sevier County building official determined 
that the plans were too old to be legible. The plans were returned to defendant. Defendant 
made a second copy of the plans using modem printing techniques, and had it delivered to 
Sevier County. (Exhibit 1). The plans contained forged engineers signatures and a stamp 
from the architect that was not signed. 
Defendant does not contest identity, location of the alleged crime in Sevier County, 
the fact that Alan Nielson (the engineer) says the signatures are not his, or that he delivered 
the plans to Sevier County. The State's case fails because there was no evidence presented 
of a purpose to defraud anyone, or of any knowledge that defendant was perpetrating a 
fraud. Further there was no evidence that the defendant knew of any problem with the 
signatures or the stamp. No inferences can be drawn from the mere fact that the signatures 
were forged because prior to the conclusion of the State's case there was uncontroverted 
evidence that both the architect and engineer had worked for defendant and that he had paid 
them in full to prepare the plans at issue. Alan Nielson was not bothered by the fact that the 
plans bore his forged signature because he did the work represented by the plans and had 
been paid for his work. There was therefore no reason for the defendant to have forged the 
plans. Why forge something you paid to have produced? There was also substantial 
evidence presented demonstrating that exhibits 1 and 2 are identical except for the printing 
method. 
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Despite the argument of the State to the contrary, there was no evidence of an intent 
to defraud the public as the State failed to put on evidence that there were any code 
violations or problems with the plans as presented to Sevier County. The State did not do 
a review of the plans to check compliance. Further, on a four-plex, the signatures of 
architects or engineers are not necessary under Utah State law. UCA 58-3a-304 (l)(b), UCA 
58-22-305(l)(b). 
Point II. The evidence which has been presented in this matter is not sufficient to 
sustain a conviction. During presentation of the defendant's case, and on rebuttal, additional 
cumulative evidence was presented on the issues of identity, location of the alleged crime 
in Sevier County, and the fact that defendant presented the plans to the county for review. 
There was no additional evidence presented demonstrating a purpose to defraud anyone, or 
demonstrating that the defendant knew he was perpetrating a fraud. There was no evidence 
whatsoever that defendant knew that there was any problem with either the stamp or the 
signature. 
Defendant put on substantial evidence setting forth the history of the construction 
project in the 1970s. There was evidence indicating the necessity of obtaining architect's 
and engineer's approvals to obtain FHA financing. There was substantial evidence that the 
architect and engineer worked for the defendant in the 1970fs, and that they were paid for 
their services. There is evidence of the changing role of the architect. There is substantial 
and uncontroverted evidence that defendant paid the architect and engineer for their 
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services, and that there were no additional funds owing. There was evidence that 20 years 
ago it was common to cut and tape plans, and that it was common not to sign across stamps. 
There was uncontroverted evidence that exhibits 1,2 and 30 are identical except for printing 
method. Exhibit 30 is signed by the FMHA official Weldon Moffitt authenticating its age. 
There is substantial evidence indicating that in effect the State has charged defendant with 
forging a document he paid others to produce. The weight of the evidence does not support 
the verdict of the trial court. 
Point III. At trial the prosecutor indicated in his opening statement that the 
defendant made an affirming remark which would assist the State in demonstrating an intent 
to defraud. The State claimed this remark was in evidence in opposing the defendant's 
motion to dismiss and another motion, and in arguing for conviction at the conclusion of 
evidence. There was no evidence whatsoever of such a statement presented at trial. 
Unfortunately, it was obvious the trial court believed the statement was in evidence as he 
made numerous references to the statement. The lack of this evidence can be analyzed both 
from the standpoint of a lack of sufficient evidence, and from the perspective of 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
In the case at bar. the prosecutor continuously referred to and argued matters not in 
evidence to the trier of fact in making his case. This problem was compounded because the 
trial court believed the non-existent evidence to have been presented, and used it in making 
a decision. If this matter is not reversed for failure to present sufficient evidence in the 
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State's case in chief, or for lack of sufficient evidence it should be remanded for a new trial 
on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct. 
Point IV. There is sufficient evidence in this record to support a reversal and an 
acquittal. There are not sufficient findings to support conviction. The only statements of 
the court that could be considered "findings" go to matters stated by the prosecutor but 
which are not in evidence. There are no findings as to who the defendant intended to 
defraud, how this took place, or what it was the defendant allegedly did to commit the crime. 
If this case is not otherwise reversed and an acquittal entered, it should be remanded for 
additional factual findings. 
ARGUMENT 
/. DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD HA VE BEEN 
GRANTED. 
At the conclusion of the State's case, defendant Derek Andreason made a motion to 
dismiss. At that juncture of the case, there was not sufficient evidence before the court to 
make out a prima facie case, and defendant's motion should have been granted. The 
material evidence before the court at the conclusion of the State's case is as follows: 
Defendant Derek Andreason was identified, John Hicks testified that he knows the 
defendant, and provided identification. (Tr.2.T9). 
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Derek Andreason submits the first set of plans. In early 1998, Mr. Andreason 
appeared at Mr. Hick's office with a set of plans and asked that they be reviewed. 
(Tr.2:20) (These plans were later introduced by defendant as exhibit number 2. 
Though identical except for the method of printing, they are not the plans which are 
the basis for the charges in this matter.) 
Defendant is notified that his first set of plans are too old. Shortly after submission 
of the first set of plans, Mr. Andreason was notified that the plans were too old, that 
codes had changed over 20 years and that they needed to be taken back to an architect 
or engineer. (Tr 2:20). Mr. Hicks apparently accomplished this by sending 
defendant exhibit Number 3. (Tr.2:32-33). 
Defendant submits the reprinted plans to Sevier County, Mr. Hicks reviews the plans. 
Within two weeks Mr. Hicks received a reprinted set of plans which were either 
delivered by defendant or dropped off at the Sevier County offices. Mr. Hicks was 
not certain how the second set of plans (Exhibit 1) came into his office. (Tr.2:26). 
When Mr. Hicks examined the second set of plans he noticed that there was no 
signature over the seal. (Tr.2:20) (Exhibit No. 1). Mr. Hicks did not compare 
exhibits 1 and 2. (Tr.2:24), (Tr.2:27:16 through 27:21) Mr. Hicks has not reviewed 
exhibit 2. (Tr.2:.30-31). Mr. Hicks has not reviewed exhibit 1 to see if it is up to 
code. (Tr.2:32). 
Mr Andreason is notified that the reprinted plans (Exhibit 1), are not acceptable. 
Mr. Andreason was notified that there was a problem with the plans and was asked 
why the architect had not signed the seal. Defendant indicated that he didn't know. 
Mr. Hicks told defendant that he could not accept the plans. (Tr.2:20,21). 
Defendant asked if he could pick up the plans. (Tr.2:21). 
Mr. Hicks contacts Josephine Rowley, Mr. Rowley is dead. Prior to telling Mr. 
Andreason that he could not accept the plans, Mr. Hicks contacted Josephene Rowley 
the widow of the architect John Rowley and spoke with her. (Tr.2:22) Mrs. 
Rowley's husband died on July 17th 1996. (Tr.2:37). Mrs. Rowle\ indicated that the 
plans (exhibit 23). had Mr. Rowley's stamp and signature, but had been taped so she 
did not believe he had done them. (Tr.2:53, Tr.2:55). 
Alan Nielsen testifies that the signatures on exhibit 1 are not his. Alan Nielsen 
reviewed what purported to be his signatures on exhibit 1, testified that they are not 
his, and that he did not authorize anyone else to sign the documents. (Tr.2:57:6-18, 
Tr.2.58.T-9). 
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The sum of the State's evidence is that defendant submitted a 20 year old set of plans 
to Sevier County. (Exhibit 2). The plans were returned to Mr. Andreason, and he was 
mailed Exhibit 3 which indicates that the plans are too old and that codes have changed. 
Defendant then submitted exhibit 1 to Sevier County. (Exhibit 1 was printed from the same 
original as exhibit 2, but used a different printing technique). The signatures on exhibits 1 
and 2 were not made by Alan Nielson, and John Rowley is dead. 
An appellate court will uphold denial of a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence 
if when reviewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences "some evidence exists from 
which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt." State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989). Accord, State v. 
Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 535 (Utah Ct.App. 1998). The standard of review for a motion to 
dismiss is a correctness standard. Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 502 (Utah 1996). The 
standard is the same in the present case although it was tried to the bench. In the case at bar, 
to prevail after a motion to dismiss its forgery charge the State must demonstrate that it has 
presented at least some evidence on each element of forgery. The elements of forgery are 
set forth in UCA 76-6-501 which states in pertinent part as follows: 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any such altered 
writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or 
utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion execution, 
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authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to be 
the act of another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent, or purports 
to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than 
was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such original 
existed. 
To make out a prima facie case against defendant the State would be required to 
present evidence that the defendant (1) with the purpose to defraud anyone, or knowing that 
he is perpetrating a fraud; (2) alters any writing of another, or utters any such altered writing 
without authority, or (3) utters any writing so that the writing purports to be the act of 
another; (4) that the defendant's actions were knowing and intentional; and that they (5) 
occurred on or about a specific date within Sevier County, State of Utah. See State v. 
Winward, 909 P.2d 909,914, (Utah App. 1995), State v. Kihlstrom 988 P.2d 949, 951 (Utah 
App. 1999), cert, denied 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000), UCA 76-6-501. 
For purposes of review of whether defendant's motion to dismiss at the end of the 
State's case should have been granted, defendant does not contest identity, location of the 
alleged crime in Sevier County, the fact that he caused the plans to be given to John Hicks, 
or that Allen Nielsen testified that the signature was not his. This inquiry is limited to 
consideration of whether the State put on any evidence from which the trier of fact could 
find that defendant acted knowingly or intentionally, and whether there was demonstration 
of an intent to defraud. Specifically, it is defendant's position that there is no evidence of 
a purpose to defraud anyone, or of knowledge on the part of the defendant that he was 
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perpetrating a fraud. Further, there is no evidence that defendant forged the documents in 
question, or knew that they contained forged signatures. 
Proof of some kind of knowledge or intent is required in a prosecution for forgery 
because the forgery statute requires a "purpose to defraud anyone," or knowledge that the 
defendant is perpetrating a fraud. (See UCA 76-6-501). In State v. Kihlstrom, 988 P.2d 
949, 952 (Utah App. 1999), cert, denied 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000), the court stated: 
Because of the difficulty of proving knowledge and intent in a prosecution for 
forgery, the quantum of evidence the State must produce before an inference of 
knowledge or intent will arise should not be unrealistically burdensome. But there 
should be some facts or circumstances from which an inference can be logically 
drawn before the defendant can be required to mount a defense and prove his lack of 
knowledge or intent. 
Evidence of knowledge or intent is critical in the case at bar, because defendant is not 
contesting the claim by the state that the signatures on the plans were not made by Alan 
Nielson. Defendant's position is that he did not forge the signatures on the plans, did not 
know that they had been forged, and that there was no evidence of an intent to defraud 
anyone. 
Review of the evidence presented by the State demonstrates that the proof is deficient 
in two important particulars. The first is that there is no evidence of intent to defraud 
anyone. The second is that there is no evidence that the defendant knew that the plans bore 
what were alleged to be a forged stamp or signature. 
At different points in argument of this case the State argued different theories 
regarding the intent to defraud "anyone". In arguing against defendant's motion to 
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consolidate the State argued that defendant intended to defraud the architect and engineer. 
(Tr.2:86). In its argument opposing the motion to dismiss the State argued that the public 
was being defrauded because of alleged code violations. (Tr.2:97). 
When the State concluded its case in chief there was no evidence of intent to defraud 
the architect, the engineer, or the County. As to the engineer, the evidence was that Alan 
Nielson was the engineer on the defendants project in the 1970's and that he was paid for 
his work. (Tr.2:59:6 to 61:19). The same is true of the architect. The testimony presented 
clearly demonstrated that John Rowley was the architect on the project, and was paid in full 
by Mr. Andreason. (Tr.2:39, through Tr.2:52). Exhibits 4-22 also demonstrate that Mr. 
Rowley was the architect on Mr. Andreason's project, and that he was paid for his services. 
Mrs. Rowley testified directly that John Rowley worked for the defendant. (Tr.2:37) (As 
part of defendant's case Alan Nielsen testified that on FMHA projects he is not paid until 
after preliminary approval). (Tr.2:126,127.) Neither in the State's case in chief nor at any 
time did the State present any evidence that any funds would have been owing to John 
Rowley or Alan Nielsen for Mr. Andreason's use of the plans. This is because the plans 
belonged to Mr. Andreason. Neither Mr. Nielsen nor the estate of John Rowley have 
complained that Defendant owes them additional funds, nor that there is a basis for 
additional funds to remain owing. John Rowley and Alan Nielson could not be considered 
as the parties defendant allegedly had a purpose to defraud. 
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A demonstration by the State of an intent to defraud is critical to supporting a 
conviction because more than the fact that a defendant uttered a document which containing 
a forged signature is necessary for conviction. In State v. Winward, 909 P.2d 909, 912 (Utah 
App. 1995) the court stated: 
However, the law does not conclusively presume that because a person signed the 
name of another a forgery has occurred, the act of signing another's name without 
permission does not constitute forgery unless it was done with the intent to defraud. 
Turner, 282 P.2d at 1047. Accordingly, to sustain a conviction for forgery, there 
must be a sufficient connection between the act of forgery and the intent to defraud. 
(Citations omitted). 
Just as there is no evidence that defendant intended to defraud the architect or 
engineer, there is no evidence that defendant had an intention to defraud the public by using 
plans that are not up to code. While John Hicks told defendant in exhibit number 3 that 
codes had changed in the last 20 years, Mr. Hicks testified that he did not do a review of 
exhibit number 1 to actually see if it was up to code. (Tr.2:30-31, Tr.2:32:l 1-14). Mr. Hicks 
did not compare exhibits 1 and 2 to see if they are identical. (Tr.2:.27:16 to 27:1). The State 
is completely lacking any evidence that defendant intended to defraud either the architect, 
the engineer, or the public. 
Despite a complete lack of evidence, the State argued that Mr. Andreason intended 
to defraud the architect and engineer, or Sevier County. This position also lacks credibility 
because under Utah law the use of an architect or engineer were not necessary for drafting 
plans for a four-plex. UCA 58-3a-304 (l)(b), UCA 58-22-305(l)(b). The signatures of the 
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architect and engineer were not necessary on these plans, and were only included in the 1978 
plans (Exhibit 2) because the signatures were necessary to obtain FHA financing. 
A particularly telling inference regarding the intent to defraud comes from 
examination and comparison of the plans themselves. The dates and all details on exhibits 
1 and 2 are identical in every detail. Both carry dates from the late 1970s. It stands to 
reason that if defendant had an intent to defraud the County by submitting forged plans, he 
would at least have changed the dates. 
A similar difficulty rises from the fact that there is no evidence that Mr. Andreason 
knew that exhibit number 1 contained an allegedly forged stamp. Nor was there any 
evidence that Mr. Andreason would have had any reason to suspect that exhibit 1 contained 
a forged signature. Under other circumstances, in considering a motion to dismiss, this lack 
of evidence might not be fatal to the State's case. In the case at bar however, the lack of any 
evidence that the defendant knew about the forgery strips the State of its ability to prove 
intent. 
Although strongly criticized in State v. Kihlstrom, 988 P.2d 949 (Utah App. 1999), 
cert, denied 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000), in State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 223 (Utah 1985), 
the court upheld a conviction for forgery where there was no evidence that the defendant 
knew the instrument was forged. Williams at 223. Were Williams applicable it might assist 
the State in demonstrating to the court that defendant had knowledge of the forgery. It 
would still not assist the State in proving an intent to defraud. In the case at bar Williams 
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is inapplicable because there is no indication in the record that the trial court relied on an 
inference that defendant had knowledge that the plans contained forged signatures, or that 
the court found that Defendant knew exhibit 1 contained forged signatures. 
Another difficulty with applying Williams to the facts of the case at bar, is that a set 
of plans, while constituting a writing, does not fit the definition of an "instrument." Blacks 
Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition) gives the primary definition of "instrument," as follows: "A 
formal or legal document in writing such as a contract, deed, will, bond, or lease. A writing 
that satisfies the requisites of negotiability prescribed by U.C.C. Art.3. . . ." Review of 
Utah's version of Article 3, UCA 70A-3-104(2) defines 'instrument" as follows: 
""Instrument" means a negotiable instrument." Finally, review of UCA 76-6-501 (b) and 
(c) both use descriptive terms consistent with the U.C.C. and Black's definitions in listing 
"instruments" which can be forged. 
A second departure from the inference apparently used in Williams comes from the 
fact that in the case at bar, the evidence before the court was that the stamp and signatures 
in question had been in place over 20 years. Careful comparison of exhibits 1 and 2 
demonstrate that they are exactly the same document, but that they were printed from a 
master (Exhibit 23) approximately 20 years apart using different printing techniques. Each 
drawing has exactly the same stamps, signatures and details, and they are identical in every 
way except the method used to produce them. Where there has been significant passage of 
time, any inferences would seem to weaken significantly. This case also lacks the fact 
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common in many forgery cases where the document in question has been stolen, or has come 
to the defendant through suspicious or unusual circumstances. State v. Kihlstrom, 988 P.2d 
949 (Utah App. 1999), cert, denied 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). State v. Satterfield 202 Kan. 
395, 449 P.2d 566, 567-69 (1969). Here the plans came to the defendant because he hired 
Alan Nielson and John Rowley to produce them, and he paid them for their services. 
A final difficulty with any attempt to apply any kind of inference to the case at bar 
is that there was substantial and uncontroverted evidence before the court prior to the time 
defendant made his motion to dismiss rebutting any inferences which might otherwise be 
made. 
It is uncontroverted that exhibit 1 is identical to exhibit 2 except for the method used 
to print them. (Compare exhibits 1 and 2). Mr. Nielson testified that he did the project 
represented in the exhibits 1 and 2 for the defendant. (Tr.2:59:2-11). Mr. Nielsen was paid 
for the work represented by the plans, and Mr. Andreason assisted with the work. 
(Tr.2:59:17-Tr.2:60:22, Tr.2:60:23-61:24). Mr. Nielson speculated that John Rowley put 
his [Nielson's] signature on the plan. (Tr.2:62:19-24). Mr. Nielson was not bothered by the 
fact that the signature was turned in as his because he did the work, and knows he previously 
signed it. (Tr.2:62:25-63:24). It was uncontroverted that John Rowley supervised this job 
for FHA for Mr. Andreason so he could get financing, and that Mr. Rowley did this work 
for Mr. Andreason in the 1970fs. (Tr.2:37:7-18, Exhibits 4-22 which consist of architects 
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agreements, canceled checks, architects notes, field reports, letters, cost breakdowns, and 
lists). It is uncontroverted that Mrs. Rowley still has John Rowley's stamp. (Tr.2:51:4-l 1). 
Where it is uncontroverted that the defendant hired Alan Nielsen and John Rowley 
to do the work represented by exhibits 1 and 2, and that they completed and were paid for 
their work, it cannot be inferred that defendant forged any part of the plans. There would 
be no reason for Mr. Andreason to forge the signatures. He paid for the work represented 
by the plans. This negates any inference of an intent to defraud. 
It is evident that all the evidence the State had at the close of its case was evidence 
that the defendant uttered a set of plans that contained an allegedly forged stamp or 
signature. There was no evidence of intent to defraud, nor of any motive to defraud. There 
was no evidence that defendant knew that some portions of exhibit 1 were allegedly forged. 
There was significant and uncontroverted evidence that the defendant hired John Rowley 
and Alan Nielsen to do the work represented by the plans, and that they were paid for their 
work. The uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that defendant had no motive to forge the 
documents. Upon review, it is evident that the State lacked sufficient evidence at the 
conclusion of its case to survive a motion to dismiss, and where the prosecution has failed 
to present sufficient evidence support its case, the matter should be dismissed. State v. 
Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 524 (Utah 1983). Defendant respectfully requests an order reversing 
the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. 
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II. THE STATE DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT 
DEFENDANT. 
In addition to seeking reversal based on the State's failure to put on sufficient 
evidence in its case in chief, defendant also challenges the overall sufficiency of the 
evidence used to convict him. The standard of review for a sufficiency challenge in a bench 
trial is as follows: 
When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, we must sustain the 
trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if we 
otherwise reach a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Spanish 
Forkv. Bryan 1999 Ut. App. 61, p.5, 975 P.2d 501 
To successfully make a sufficiency challenge on appeal an appellant must: 
. . . marshal all the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then 
demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below, the 
evidence is insufficient to support the findings. Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 
1068, 1970 (Utah 1985), State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990). 
State v. Larsen 999 P.2d 1252 (Utah App. 2000). 
In setting forth the evidence which was before the court at the time Defendant made his 
motion to dismiss, defendant has satisfied the bulk of the marshaling requirement. (See 
evidence set forth in the preceding argument). In considering Defendant's challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence, defendant respectfully requests that the court consider the 
evidence previously marshaled. 
During Defendant's case, and during the State's rebuttal, the following additional 
evidence was elicited which would go to elements of forgery. The evidence which follows 
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goes only to reinforce elements demonstrated prior to defendant's motion to dismiss. There 
was no evidence offered demonstrating either intent to defraud, or that defendant knew the 
plans contained forged signatures. 
Dana Andreason identifies the defendant and relates the history ofthefour-plexes. 
During defendant's case in chief, defendant's wife Dana Andreason identified the 
defendant and testified that he was involved in the construction of the four-plexes. 
(Tr.2:102-104). 
Alan Nielson conjectures that the base sheet was prepared on a computer, then 
modifies that statement. 
When cross examined by the State, Alan Nielson conjectured that the base sheet for 
exhibits 1 and 2 were done on a computer. (Tr. 2:130, 131). Upon further 
examination he testified that exhibit 23 (the master from which exhibits 1 and 2 were 
made) was either computer generated or commercially prepared. (Tr.2:139) Mr. 
Nielson further testified that if the 1978 dates are accurate the base sheet was 
commercially prepared. (Tr.2:140) Mr. Nielson testified that commercially produced 
base sheets were available in the 1970's. (Tr.2:141). 
Derek Andreason identifies himself as the defendant, and indicates that he worked 
with Alan Nielson on the plans. 
Derek Andreason took the stand and identified himself as the defendant. (Tr.3:158). 
Mr. Andreason indicates that he assisted Alan Nielson. (Tr.3:163). 
Defendant admits that he had exhibit number 1 prepared, that he received exhibit 
number 3 and that he had plans dropped off. 
Defendant had exhibit number 1 prepared, and admits that he received exhibit 
number 3. (Tr.3:175, Tr.3:198, Tr.3:200). Defendant had his office staff drop off 
plans (Tr.3:201). 
Defendant admits that he received John Hicks letter indicating that building codes 
and standards had changed over the past 20 years. 
On cross examination Mr. Andreason was asked to read the text of John Hick's letter. 
(Exhibit 3). (Tr.3:207). Mr. Andreason also teified that he knows building codes 
have changed over the past 20 years. (Tr.3:207). 
Defendant admitted that he had exhibit number 1 prepared. 
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Defendant Derek Andreason had a new set of drawings (Exhibit 1) prepared from 
the originals. (Tr.3:226). 
Because this appeal is based on a bench trial, this court must consider both whether 
there was evidence presented as to each element, and whether the evidence presented 
convinces the court that an error has been made. In Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 UT 
App. 61, paragraph 5, 975 P.2d 501 the court stated: 
However, before we can uphold a conviction it must be supported by a quantum of 
evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged from which the fact finder 
may base its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Further, Bryan also indicates that the court must consider whether the trial court's 
verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence. Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 UT 
App. 61, paragraph 5, 975 P.2d 501. In the case at bar, the trial court has found the 
defendant guilty without sufficient evidence regarding the elements of the crime, and has 
done so against the clear weight of uncontroverted evidence. 
As with the challenge to denial of defendant's motion to dismiss discussed above, 
defendant does not contest identity, location of the alleged crime in Sevier County, 
responsibility for having the plans (Exibit 1) given to John Hicks, or that Alan Nielsen 
testified that the signature was not his. It is defendant's position that there was no evidence 
of a purpose or intent to defraud anyone, that there was no evidence that defendant knew he 
was perpetrating a fraud, and that there was no evidence that defendant knew exhibit number 
1 contained a forgery. 
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While the standard of review is different, the facts and much of the argument 
supporting defendant' previous argument is applicable here. Rather than repeat the 
arguments set forth above, defendant simply reincorporates them. Defendant's conviction 
cannot survive a sufficiency challenge where there is no evidence of an intention of 
defrauding anyone, and where there is no evidence that defendant knew of the forgery. State 
v. Winward, 909 P.2d 909, 912 (Utah Appl 1995), State v. Kihlstrom, 988 P.2d 949, 952 
Utah App. 1999), cert, denied 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). 
/ / / . THE VERDICT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT 
OF THE EVIDENCE. 
In challenging a conviction based on a bench trial, defendant also has the opportunity 
to demonstrate that the decision of the trial court was against the weight of the evidence. 
Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 UT App. 61, paragraph 5, 975 P.2d 501 (Utah App. 
1999). 
At the trial in this matter, the defendant put on the bulk of the evidence, none of 
which was controverted. The uncontroverted evidence which was presented at trial is more 
than sufficient to demonstrate that the decision of the trial judge was against the clear weight 
of the evidence. Both on cross examination of the State's witnesses, and in his case in chief, 
defendant established the following facts: 
Exhibits 1 and 2 are identical except for the method used to print them. Exhibit 1 is 
identical to exhibit 2 except that exhibit 2 was produced using a modem printing 
technique. (Compare exhibits 1 and 2). 
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This fact is important because it is uncontroverted that exhibit number 2 was the plan 
produced in the late 1970's and used to construct defendant's other four-plexes. This 
eliminates any claim or argument that the forgery was recent, or that defendant in any way 
altered or modified exhibit 1 before submitting it to Sevier County. The age of the 
document is also important because the evidence demonstrates that there was no reason for 
defendant to forge the original document when it was created in the late nineteen seventies. 
Alan Nielson worked for Derek Andreas on, believed that John Rowley forged the 
signatures, and was not bothered by the fact that his signature was forged. 
According to Alan Nielson he acted as the civil engineer on the project represented 
in exhibits 1 and 2. This was done at the request of Mr. Andreason. (Tr.2:59). 
Defendant paid Mr. Nielson for the work represented by the plans, and also assisted 
with the work. (Tr.2:59-61). Mr. Nielson testified that he believed John Rowley put 
his [Nielson's] signature on the drawings. (Tr.2:62). Mr. Nielson did not care that 
the forged signature was turned in as his because he did the work represented, was 
paid for the work, and was certain he signed the drawings previously. (Tr.2:62-63). 
Mr. Nielson testified that on FHA projects engineers are paid after approval. 
(Tr.2:126, 127). 
These facts are important because it demonstrates that there would be no reason for 
Mr. Andreason to forge Alan Nielson's signature. There is no reason to forge signatures on 
a document when you hired the engineer to do the work represented by the drawing and he 
was paid for the work. This fact also demonstrates that Alan Nielson was not in any way 
defrauded by the defendant. 
Alan Nielson testified about practices which were common in engineering 20 years 
ago. Alan Nielson testified that commercially prepared base sheets were available 
20 years ago. (Tr.2:141). Mr. Nielson also testified that it was common in the 1970s 
to cut and tape drawings, and that previously a signature through the seal was not 
required. (Tr.2:127, 128),(Tr.2:133). Finally, Alan Nielson testified that he believed 
that John Rowley put the seal on (exhibit 23) after it was taped together. (Tr.2:142). 
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Alan Nielson's testimony is important because it establishes that the kind of sheets 
exhibits 1 and 2 are printed on were available in the 1970s, and that prior to the time 
computers came to use for drafting it was common to cut and tape plans. This lends 
credibility to the claim that exhibit 23 is over 20 years old. If exhibit 23 is over 20 years old, 
there would have been no reason for the defendant to forge the document. Mr. Nielson's 
testimony discredits any claim that John Rowley's seal was forged. 
John Rowley was the supervising architect for Derek Andreason. John Rowley's 
widow still has his stamp. 
John Rowley supervised the architectural aspects of construction of the four-plexes 
for Mr. Andreason because architect supervision was required to obtain FHA 
financing. Mr. Rowley did this work for Mr. Andreason in the 1970's. (Tr.2:37:7-18, 
Exhibits 4-22 consisting of architects agreements, canceled checks, architects notes, 
field reports, letters, cost breakdowns, and lists). It is uncontroverted that Mrs. 
Rowley still has John Rowley's stamp. (Tr.2:51:4-l 1). 
The above facts again eliminate any argument that any forgery was recent, or that 
there was any recent alteration of exhibit 1. John Rowley was clearly hired to do the work 
represented in the drawings, and was paid for his work. There would be no motive for 
defendant to forge John Rowley's stamp. This fact also eliminates any possibility that Derek 
Andreason stamped the documents as Mrs. Rowley still has the stamp. 
Dana Andreason testifies about the construction of four-plexes in the late 1970s. 
Dana Andreason testified that three of the four-plexes constructed in the late 1970s 
were federally financed. (Tr.2:104). Federal financing required the services of a 
contractor and an architect. (Tr.2:105). Alan Nielson was hired as the surveyor. 
(Tr.2:106) John Rowley was hired as the architect and paid in full.(Tr.2:107-109, 
Exhibits 7,8,10,17,18,19 and 20). Both the architect and engineer were paid based 
on progress payments, not up front. (Tr.2:l 11, 112). 
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Mrs. Andreason's testimony is important in corroborating the evidence indicating that 
John Rowley and Alan Nielson were employees of Mr. Andreason and that they were paid. 
The evidence regarding progress payments is important as it eliminates any argument of 
intent to defraud Nielson or Rowley as payments to them if any would only have been owing 
after receipt of progress payments by the lender. 
Don Munk testifies regarding his role in construction. 
Mr. Munk indicated that he was hired as the general contractor for construction of 
the four-plexes. (Tr.2:l 15, 116). He also testified that there was FHA financing, and 
that John Rowley was the architect. (Tr.2:l 16, 117). 
Don Munk's testimony corroborates the other testimony regarding the financing and 
the role of John Rowley. 
John Hicks testified that he needed a cleaner more readable copy, and that he never 
did a review of the plans. 
On cross examination John Hicks admitted telling Derek Andreason that he needed 
a cleaner more readable copy of the plans. (Tr.2:32). Mr. Hicks admitted that he 
never compared exhibits 1 and 2, and that he can't tell if the details are different. 
(Tr.2:24, 27, 28). Mr. Hicks never checked exhibit 1 to see if it was in compliance 
with modern building codes. (Tr.2:32) Mr. Hicks admitted that the dates on exhibits 
1 and 2 appeared to be the same. (Tr.2:31). 
The testimony from Mr. Hicks is critical primarily because he never compared 
exhibits 1 and 2, and because he never checked to see if exhibit 1 was in compliance with 
modern building codes. Without a review of exhibit 1 for code compliance there can be 
nothing beyond mere speculation that there was an intent to defraud Sevier County by 
submitting drawings that don't comply with the code. Defendant has demonstrated 
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previously that there was no attempt to defraud the architect or engineer. This testimony 
demonstrates that there is no evidence of intent to defraud the county. Without 
demonstration of an intent to defraud, the conviction cannot stand. 
Desley Andreason testified regarding his role in construction of the Four-plex. 
Desley Andreason testified that he was superintendent of the four-plex construction 
project. (Tr.2:171). He identified exhibit 2 as the plans used to construct the four-
plexes. (Tr.3:171). Mr. Andreason testified that exhibit number 30 is the same 
document as exhibit number 2. (Tr.3:171). Mr. Andreason also identified the 
signature of Weldon Moffett on exhibit 30 and indicated that he worked for FMHA. 
(Tr.3:171-172). Desley Andreason testified that John Rowley was the architect on 
thejob.(Tr.3:173). 
Desley Andreason's testimony corroborates the fact that exhibit 2 and exhibit 30 are 
the same. Exhibit 30 is important because it bears the signature of Weldon Moffett the 
FMHA official. This corroborates the claim that exhibit 1 is simply a copy of 20 year old 
plans. 
Derek Andreason testified regarding his role in construction of the four-plexes. 
Mr. Andreason testified that he is a draftsman, but he learned that he would have to 
hire a contractor for construction of the three four-plexes. (Tr.3:161-162). He also 
learned that he would need to hire a surveyor and architect. (Tr.3:163). Mr. 
Andreason worked with Alan Nielsen in surveying the property, and in drafting. 
(Tr.3:163. Mr. Andreason retained John Rowley as the architect. (Tr.3:163). 
Originally John Rowley was to check Mr. Andreason's drawings. Later it was 
determined that because of FMHA requirements Mr. Rowley was required to be 
responsible for the design work. (Tr.3:164). Mr. Andreason identified exhibit 2 as 
the plans used to construct the four-plexes in the 1970s. Defendant had previously 
done drawings for the four-plexes. Mr. Andreason gave Mr. Rowley all of the 
drawings he had produced, and when he got them back from John Rowley they were 
on full sheets with Mr. Rowley's letterhead on them. (Tr.3:166)(Exhibit 23). 
Blueprints were printed from those sheets. (Tr.3:166, 167). Mr. Andreason indicates 
that exhibit 30 is from the FMHA file. (Tr.3:169). Exhibits 1 and 2 are identical to 
each other and to exhibit 30, except for the printing technique. (Tr.3:174, 175). Mr. 
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Andreason explained that he drew a number of the details represented on exhibits 1 
and 2 but that they were put in their present format by John Rowley when he prepared 
the cut and taped master. (Exhibit 23)(Tr.3:176-178). Mr. Andreason explained how 
John Rowley's role in the project changed based on FMHA requirements. The 
contracts with Mr. Rowley changed accordingly. (Tr.3:178-181). Mr. Andreason 
discussed exhibits IK 12, 13, 14 and 22 which are FMHA inspection reports signed 
by John Rowley. (Mr. Andreason further described the relationship with John 
Rowley, and how the plans were prepared. (Tr.3:181-194) Mr. Andreason describes 
his work in preparation of exhibit 33. (Exhibit 33 is the set of plans actually used to 
build the four-plex constructed in the late 1990s). (Tr.3:201, 202). Mr. Andreason 
testified that Alan Nielson worked for him. (Tr.3:202-203). He also indicated that 
he did not forge the signatures and that he would have no reason to do so. (Tr.3:202, 
203). John Rowley worked for Mr. Andreason and was paid. (Tr.3:205) Mr. 
Andreason denies ever having possession of John Rowley's stamp. (Tr.3:205). 
Derek Andreason's testimony is important in a number of respects. First, it 
corroborates the other witnesses demonstrating that John Rowley and Alan Nielson worked 
for Mr. Andreason, and that they were paid for their work. (Eliminating any intent to 
defraud them). Second, Mr. Andreason's testimony explains the changing role of John 
Rowley, and how Mr. Rowley came to be in possession of details drawn by Mr. Andreason. 
Third, Mr. Andreason's testimony confirms that exhibits 1, 2 and 30 are identical except for 
the method used to produce them. This fact is critical because the signature from the FMHA 
official on exhibit 30 proves the age of the documents. The age of the documents is critical 
because if exhibits 1, 2 and 30 are the age claimed, there would be no reason for Mr. 
Andreason to have forged any part of those documents as he paid in full for their 
preparation. This eliminates any purpose to defraud, or knowledge that a fraud is being 
perpetrated. Mr. Andreason's testimony also lends credence to Alan Nielson's conjecture 
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that John Rowley forged the signatures on exhibits 1, 2, and 30. Finally, Mr. Andreason's 
testimony is important because he lays the foundation for exhibit 33 which is the set of plans 
actually used to construct the four-plex. Exhibit 33 is important because it demonstrates that 
the signatures of Alan Nielson and John Rowley were not even necessary for approval of the 
project. Even if the Nielson signatures were forgeries uttering a document containing those 
signatures is not a forgery unless there was an intent to defraud. The intent is not present 
if the signatures were not necessary. State v. Winward 909 P.2d 909, 912, 913 (Utah App. 
1995). 
In the final analysis, this case should be reversed for lack of sufficient evidence first, 
because the State failed to demonstrate a purpose on the part of the defendant to perpetrate 
a fraud, or knowledge that a fraud was being perpetrated. Secondly, reversal should enter 
because there was no demonstration of an intent to defraud. Third, reversal should occur 
and an acquittal enter because the decision of the trial court was against the weight of the 
evidence. 
In considering defendant's claim that there was not sufficient evidence to support the 
verdict of the trial court, it is important to note that the trial court appeared to rely on 
statements made by the prosecutor which were never supported by evidence. These 
statements were in the form of an alleged affirmative declaration from the defendant to John 
Hicks telling Mr. Hicks that the plans (Exhibit 1) had been reviewed and that they were up 
to code. If there were evidence of such a statement in the record it might well prove a 
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purpose to defraud, or knowledge on the part of the defendant that a fraud was being 
perpetrated. Without this evidence which the trial court apparently believed to have existed 
but which did not, the State has failed to make its case, and this matter must be reversed. 
This position is consistent with decisions from other states essentially holding that 
in a bench trial the Court should only consider the "evidence introduced at trial and 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom." People v. Nelson 627 N.E.2d 28, 32 (111. App. 1 
Dist.1993), People v. Gonzalez 175, 111. App.3d 466, 124 111. Dec.910, 529 N.E.2d 1027 
(1987). See also: People v. Simon, 473 N.W. 2d 785, 787 (Mich. App. 1991). 
IV. IN DECIDING THIS CASE THE TRIAL COURT RELIED ON STATEMENTS 
FROM THE PROSECUTOR WHICH WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE 
In the case at bar, the trial court in making its decision relied on statements from the 
prosecutor rather than the evidence actually admitted in making a decision. This error can 
be analyzed either as prosecutorial misconduct, or as a lack of sufficient evidence. 
Sufficiency has been previously discussed in this brief. 
In his opening statement, the prosecutor claimed that there was a conversation 
between John Hicks, a Sevier County building official, and Derek Andreason the defendant. 
In this conversation the defendant is purported to have made an affirmative declaration to 
Mr. Hicks indicating that the plans which had been submitted had been reviewed and that 
they were up to code. (Tr.2:12-13). 
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When Mr. Hicks testified, he did not in any way testify that there was such a 
declaration in any conversation with Mr. Andreason. (Tr.2:19-33). Later, when defendant 
moved for dismissal at the conclusion of the State's case, the prosecutor again referenced this 
supposed affirmative declaration even though there had been no evidence of the declaration 
presented to the court. (Tr.2:96-97). At this juncture of the trial, it is apparent that the trial 
judge was convinced that the conversation where the affirmative declaration supposedly 
took place had occurred, as he asked counsel questions about the conversation as though it 
was in evidence. (Tr.2:100). 
At the conclusion of defendant's case, John Hicks was again called to testify. Again, 
there was no reference to the affirmative declaration. (Tr.3:230-232). In his closing 
argument, the prosecutor again referred to the supposed conversation and declaration, 
(Tr.3:234,259,260,261) and again the trial court referenced the conversation in questioning 
counsel, and in making his ruling.(Tr.3:235, 249, 252,254,259, and 268). This occurred 
despite argument from defense counsel that there was no evidence of the conversation 
occurring, or at best that there was a dispute in the evidence. (Tr.3:252). 
Surprisingly, while there is a great body of case law discussing the circumstance 
where a prosecutor makes inappropriate comments before a jury, there is little or no law 
discussing the situation where a trial court is obviously mislead by the statements of the 
prosecutor. Presumably, on appeal the difficulty can be handled simultaneously but in two 
different ways. First, an appellant can challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, which 
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defendant has done elsewhere in this brief. In challenging sufficiency defendant will of 
course be subject to that standard of review. Secondly, the error can be challenged as 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
The standard for considering prosecutorial misconduct is set forth in State v. 
Saunders, 992 P.2d 951 (Utah 1999), where the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The test for determining whether a prosecutor's statements in closing argument are 
improper and constitute error is whether his remarks "call to the jurors' attention 
matters which they would not be justified in considering in reaching a verdict." State 
v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah 1982); see also Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785 
The second part of the test is whether the trier of fact was in fact influenced by the improper 
remarks in reaching a verdict. Ironically, this standard is set forth in State v. Andreason, 718 
P.2d 400, 402,(Utah 1986). The Andreason case is one of at least three cases where 
comments by the prosecutor in this case were held to have constituted error. State v. 
Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 1986), State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106, 1112 (Utah 
1985), State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1224 (Utah 1993). The Andreason case states: 
The standard applicable to reviewing alleged prejudicial remarks of counsel is 
whether the remarks call the attention of the jurors to matters they would not be 
justified in considering in determining their verdict. If so, then defendant must show 
that, under the circumstances of this case, the jurors were probably influenced in 
reaching their verdict.. . . (Andreason at 402). 
In analyzing whether there were statements made to the trier of fact which should not 
have been considered in rendering a verdict, the first task is reviewing the record to see what 
was stated. The second task will be to determine whether the improper comments likely 
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made a difference in the outcome of the trial. Again, this requires a careful review of the 
record. 
In his opening statement the prosecutor described a conversation which supposedly 
took place between the defendant and John Hicks. 
MR BROWN: "Mr. Hicks looked at the plans, asked him if he had returned them to 
the architect and had them reviewed and updated. The defendant indicated that he 
had.M(Tr.2:12). 
The prosecutor later stated: 
"He asked if they had been returned. The defendant indicated they had, they'd been 
reviewed by the architect, and that they're now in conformity, in compliance." 
(Tr.2:12-13). 
In reviewing the transcript of the trial, there is no testimony from Mr. Hicks regarding this 
conversation. 
The second instance where we hear about this conversation is in the argument over 
defendant's motion to dismiss. Counsel for defendant argued that there was no evidence of 
intent to defraud. (Tr.2:96-97). The court asked the State for its response. (Tr.2:97) Mr. 
Brown argued as follows: 
Mr. BROWN: We do have that information. What we have is we have the testimony 
of John Hicks, that he told the defendant that there have been a lot of changes in the 
code in the last 20 years, and that's why he had to come back, because he had to get 
the changes made. That's exactly what he didn't do. What he did do is then return 
with what was supposed to be a clear stamp of the architect, and confirms to Mr. 
Hicks that he'd taken it back and that the modifications had been made. 
Now, we don't need any more than that because that was the end of it. Mr. Hicks did 
not give him the permit, because he saw the problem, and he found out that the 
architect was in fact dead, and had been dead more than the two weeks in which the 
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defendant confirmed that he'd taken it back to him. That's all that's needed as far as 
demonstration of defrauding the public. (Tr.2: 97). 
At this point in the evidence counsel for defendant argued that there was no evidence 
that Defendant ever represented that modifications had been made. (Tr.2:97, 100). 
The final reference to this non-existent evidence occurred during closing argument. 
Interestingly, the last witness at the trial was John Hicks who was called as a rebuttal witness 
by the State. Mr. Hicks did not testify about any affirmative declarations from Mr. 
Andreason. In his closing argument, Counsel for the State argued: 
"He made the representation that he had them reviewed, and (inaudible) his testimony 
of Mr. Hicks during initial presentation, that the defendant thought that the architect 
was still alive. (Tr.3:234). 
The comment about the affirmative declaration from the defendant was repeated later in the 
argument: 
MR. BROWN: Even if it was done righteously in 1978, he cannot come in and assert 
that it's been redone again. 
THE COURT: What do you think, he was going to make that affirmative declaration 
to Mr. Hicks? 
Mr. BROWN: I think he made his point. I think he made it when he delivered the 
plans, and when Mr. Hicks asked him if it had been reviewed by the architect, and 
I think he did it again after, during the conversation that we heard about today. 
(Tr.3:259). 
The same argument was repeated two more times. On page Tr.3 page 260 Mr. Brown 
claims: 
"He also made declarations that he had, had it reviewed." 
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Again the same claim is argued: 
"Has probably said that they are, that they've been reviewed and updated.'* 
(Tr.3:261). 
The repeated insistence by the prosecutor that this affirming conversation occurred 
would be less troubling if not for the fact that as the trial proceeded it became obvious that 
the trial court believed the argument and accepted it as proven fact. This began to occur in 
the argument on the Motion to Dismiss. 
THE COURT: Mr. Brown is laying some statement that Mr. Andreason speaks. Hefs 
saying that there was a conversation between Mr. Andreason and Mr. Hicks, and Mr. 
Andreason made affirmative declarations about what he brought in on May 7 of 
1998. Do you agree or disagree with that? (Tr.2:100). 
The court's continued reliance on the statements of the prosecutor is evident again in 
the argument at the conclusion of trial. 
THE COURT: So that's why Exhibit 3 becomes important, and the statement that you 
lay at Mr. Andreason's feet where he says "I've had these plans reviewed, and here 
they are." 
MR. BROWN: Yes. (Tr.3:235). 
The next reference by the court to the statement is on page 249 of the transcript. 
THE COURT: What about this. What if the knowledge that is required is knowledge 
to say, "Here's my updated plans. I've taken these to an architect and engineer, and 
these have all been updated'? Is that knowledge enough? I mean, leave out the 
knowledge of whether the signatures were bad. Just focus in on the knowledge that's 
represented by the State, "Here is my updated plans. I'm responding to your letter. 
I've had these plans updated. Here they are." (Tr.2:249). 
Later, the judge engaged in a colloquy with counsel over the status of the evidence. 
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THE COURT: Now, he had a conversation with Mr. Hicks about exhibit No. 1, and 
I'm not sure I've got it in my memory the time or the place, but I think he had a 
conversation with Mr. Hicks about Exhibit No. 1, where he said, "I've brought you the 
updated plans. I've had them reviewed. Please take a look at them." agree or 
disagree about that? 
MR. MCCANDLESS: I think at best we have a dispute on the evidence about it. I 
think there was certainly the letter that went back and forth on Exhibit No. 1. I think 
we have some disagreement about the content about (sic) the conversation. 
THE COURT: Well let me lay one other little thing on you and see if you agree or 
disagree. The conversation where Mr. Andreason said, "I've had that plans looked 
at. Here they are" is not the same conversation Mr. Hicks told us about just a few 
minutes ago. What do you think about that? (Tr.3:252-253). 
The Court later stated: 
THE COURT: Maybe one of the keys is whether there's evidence to show the 
defendant made some kind of affirmative declaration that was in essence, "I've had 
the plans reviewed. Here they are," and that declaration came after Exhibit 3." 
(Tr.3:254). 
After response by counsel the court asks: 
THE COURT: Does the affirmative declaration have to be made at the same time that 
the papers are passed? (Tr.3:255). 
On page 259 of the transcript of the trial the court continues this theme asking Mr. Brown: 
THE COURT: What do you think, he was going to make that affirmative declaration 
to Mr. Hicks? 
MR. BROWN: I think he made his point. I think he made it when he delivered the 
plans, and when Mr. Hicks asked him if it had been reviewed by the architect, and 
I think he did it again after, during the conversation we heard about today. (Tr.3:259). 
Finally, in making its ruling on the case the court made one last reference to the defendant's 
"actions" after receiving exhibit number 3. 
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THE COURT: The facts have shown me, convinced me beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Mr. Andreason committed a forgery because he uttered Exhibit No. 1 to Sevier 
County, and he intended that utterance to be — to have been executed at a time and 
place other than in fact was the case. The reason I reach that conclusion is because 
Exhibit No. 1 can only be interpreted in light of Exhibit No. 3, Mr. Andreasonfs 
actions taken in response to Exhibit No. 3. (Tr.3:268). 
In reviewing the above comments from the court and from counsel for the State, two 
things are clear. The first is that the prosecutor made extensive references to an affirmative 
declaration of the defendant which was never made. The declaration was therefore 
something which the trier of fact should not have considered in making a decision. A 
comment by a prosecutor suggesting that the trier of fact consider matters outside the 
evidence is prosecutorial misconduct. State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984). The 
second is that the trial court believed that the declaration had been made, and used that 
declaration in making a decision. This is evident because of the extensive references which 
the trial court made to the affirmative declaration. This satisfies the harmflilness test of the 
prosecutorial misconduct test. State v. Emmett 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992). 
There is little or no Utah law directly on point considering when statements by a 
prosecutor in a bench trial constitute misconduct, and require reversal. It is defendant's 
position however, that there is no reason to depart from the standard used injury cases when 
there is sufficient record to demonstrate that the judge, acting as a trier of fact, actually relied 
on the improper statements in making a decision. 
It is evident that the comments of the prosecutor in this matter were believed by the 
trial court and used in making a decision. If this court does not reverse defendant's 
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conviction based on lack of sufficient evidence at the time defendant made his motion to 
dismiss, or on the claim that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain conviction, defendant 
should be granted a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE SUFFICIENT FINDINGS TO 
SUPPORT A GUILTY VERDICT. 
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that "In all actions tried upon 
the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and 
state separately its conclusions of law theron, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A. . . . " Rule 52 is made applicable to criminal cases pursuant to URCP Rule 81(e). In 
the case at bar, the only finding of fact made by the trial court was a judgment finding the 
defendant guilty of forgery. (R. at 201). 
The failure to make formal findings of fact and conclusions of law is not a problem 
if there are sufficient findings made orally from the bench. When considering a case on 
appeal, a reviewing court is not limited to review of the document titled "Findings." 
Findings may be made in the form of oral statements made from the bench. Erwin v. Erwin 
773 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah App. 1989). In the case at bar, the trial court made some limited 
statements which could be considered findings. (Tr.3:267-268). 
Unfortunately, the statements of the trial court do not specifically discuss what 
evidence specifically meets each of the elements of the forgery statute. Specifically, there 
are no findings of the court indicating who it was Mr. Andreason was attempting to defraud, 
or demonstrating that Mr. Andreason knew he was perpetrating a fraud. There are also no 
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findings indicating that Mr. Andreason knew that any of the exhibits contained forged 
signatures. Without these findings the conviction cannot be supported. 
Candidly, the court did make statements which could possibly be construed as 
findings in the comments made about the affirmative declarations supposedly made by the 
defendant to John Hicks. In the last of these the court stated: 
THE COURT: The facts have shown me, convinced me beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Mr. Andreason committed a forgery because he uttered Exhibit no. 1 to Sevier 
County, and he intended that the utterance to be — to have been executed at a time 
and place other than in fact was the case. The reason I reach that conclusion is 
because Exhibit No. 1 can only be interpreted in light of Exhibit No. 3, Mr. 
Andreason's actions taken in response to No. 3. (Tr.2:268). 
As defendant has pointed out previously there is no support in the record for Mr. 
Andreason having done anything in response to Exhibit No. 3 except for submitting exhibit 
number 1. Exhibit number 1 is identical to exhibit 2 except for the method of printing. The 
supposition that Mr. Andreason took other actions or made comments, is based entirely on 
statements made by the prosecutor, rather than on evidence, and cannot be the basis for 
findings of fact.(Tr.2.T2-13, 96, 97, Tr.3:234, 259, 260 and 261). (Tr.2:100, Tr.3:235, 249, 
252, 254, 259, and 268). 
If as defendant contends there are no findings on these issues because there was no 
evidence presented, no reversal and remand for additional findings is needed because the 
State failed to meet its burden of proof. If however, the court finds that the evidence is 
sufficient, defendant requests that this matter be remanded to allow the trial court to make 
findings of fact. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, defendant Derek Andreason respectfully requests the Court 
reverse defendant's conviction and enter an acquittal if the State failed to meet its burden 
prior to defendant's motion to dismiss. The same relief is requested if the court determines 
that the State failed to offer sufficient evidence to support the conviction. If the court fails 
to reverse the conviction, and enter an acquittal, defendant requests the court reverse this 
matter and remand for a new trial on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct, or reverse for 
further findings if the findings are not adequate. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ZS_ day of April, 2001. 
SCRIBNER, STIRLAND & McCANDLESS, P.C. 
B Y : i 2 ^ ^ ^ ^ 
DONALD E. McCANDLESS 
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Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM "A 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all ex-
traordinary writs and to issue all wnts and process necessary. 
(a> to earn- into effect its judgments, orders, and de-
crees, or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, includ-
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over-
fa) the final orders and decrees resul t ing from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from 
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed-
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commis-
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire 
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive direc-
tor of tne DeDartment of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer 
(b) appeals from the district court review of 
(1) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies, and 
(n) a challenge to agencv action under Section 
6C-46a-12 1 
IQ apoeals from the juvenile courts. 
<d) interlocutor, appeals from anv court of record in 
c rmmai cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony, 
< e) apoeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction o: a first degree or 
capital felonv, 
if) appeals from orders on petition* for extraordinary 
wnts sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving 
any other criminal sentence except oe t i fons constituting 
a challenge to a conviction of or tne sentence for a first 
degree or capital felony; 
»g) apoeals from the orders on petitions for extraordi-
n a n writs challenging the decs ions of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felonv, 
«h» apctals from district cou't involving domestic rela-
tions cases including but not limited to divorce, annul-
ment property division child custodv supDort, visitation, 
adoption, and paternity 
U) appeals from the Utah Mibta^v Court, and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the 
Supreme Court 
(3> The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by 
the vote of four judges of the court mav certifv to the Supreme 
Court for original appellate review and determination any 
matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comolv with the require-
ments of Title 63 Chapter 46b, Administrat ive Procedures 
Act. in its review of agency adjudicativ e proceedings 1996 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury 
or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially 
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and 
judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A, in granting 
or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly 
set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its action Requests for findings are 
not necessary for purposes of review Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial esurt to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses The findings of a master to the extent that the 
court adopts them, shall be cons.cered as the findings of the 
court It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law are stated orally and recoraed in open court following 
the close of the evidence or appear :n an opinion or memoran-
dum of decision filed by the court The trial court need not 
enter findings of fact and conclusions of lav. in rulings on 
motions, except as provided m Rule 41(b) The court shall, 
however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a> and 
fb), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one 
ground 
(b) Amendment Upon motion of a party made not later 
than 10 days after entry of j augment the court may amend its 
findings or make additional findings and may amend the 
judgment accordingly. The motion ma} be made with a motion 
for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 When findings of fact are 
made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question 
of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may 
thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the 
question has made m the district court an objection to such 
findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion 
for judgment, or a motion for a new trial 
(c) Waiter of findings of fact and conclusions oflau Except 
in actions for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law 
may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial, 
(2) by consent m writing filed :n the cause, 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
70A-3-104. Negotiable instrument. 
(1) Except as provided m Subsections (3) and (4), Nego-
tiable instrument" means an unconditional promise or order to 
pay a fixed amount of monev, w ith or without interest or other 
charges described m the promise or order, if it 
(a) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is 
issued or first comes into possession of a holder, 
(b) is payable on demand or at a definite time, and 
(c) does not state anv other undertaking or instruction 
by the person promising or ordering payment to do any 
act in addition to the pav raent of monev, but the promise 
or order may contain 
(i) an undertaking or power to give, maintain, or 
protect collateral to secure pav ment, 
(n) an authorization or power to the holder to 
confess judgment or -ealize on or dispose of collateral, 
or 
(in) a waiver of the benefit o rany lau intended for 
the adv antage or protection of an obligor 
(2) "Instrument" means a negotiable instrument 
(3) An order that meets all of the recuirements of Subsec-
tion (1), except Subsection (I (a), and otherwise falls withm 
the definition of "check" in Subsection (6) is a negotiable 
instrument and a check 
(4) A promise or order other than a check is not an instru-
ment if, at the time it is issued or first comes into possession 
of a holder, it contains a conspicuous statement, however 
expressed, to the effect that the promise or order is not 
negotiable or is not an instrument governed bv this chapter 
(5) An instrument is a 'note" if it is a promise and is a 
"draft" if it is an order If an instrument falls withm the 
definition of both "note" ana ""draft ~ a person entitled to 
enforce the instrument ma> treat it as either 
(6) (a) 'Check" means 
U) a draft other than a documentary draft, pav-
able on demand and drawn on a bank, 
(n) a cashiers check or teller's check, or 
(m) a demand draft 
(b) An instrument ma> be a check even though it is 
descnbed on its face bv another term, such as "money 
order" 
(7) **Cashier's check" means a draft with respect to which 
the drawer and draw.ee are the same oank or branches of tne 
same bank 
(8) "Teller's check" means a draft draw n by a bank either on 
another bank or payable at or through a bank 
(9) "Traveler's cneck" means an instrument that 
(a) is payable on demand, 
(b) is drawn on or pav able at or through a bank, 
(c) is designated by the term "traveler s check" or by a 
substantiallv similar term, and 
(d) requires as a condition to payment, a countersig-
nature by a person whoae specimen signature appears on 
the instrument 
(10) "Certificate of deposit" rnears an instrument contain-
ing an acknowledgment bv a bank tnat a sum of monev has 
been received by the banK and a promise by the bank to repav 
the sum of money A certificate of deposit is a note of the bank 
(11) (a; "Demand draft" means a writing not signed by a 
customer that is created bv a third party under the 
purported authority of tne customer for the purpose of 
charging the customer's account with a bank 
(b) A demand draft 
(I) shall contain the customer's account number, 
(n) may contain arv or all of the following 
(A) the customers printed or typewritten 
name, 
(B) a notation that the customer authorized 
the draft, or 
(C) the statement ~Xo Signature Required" or 
words to that effect and 
(in) may not include a check purportedly drawn bv 
and bearing the signature of a fiduciary, as defined m 
Section 70A-3-307^ 199s 
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud 
anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be 
perpetrated by anyone, he. 
(a; alters any writing of another without his authority 
or utters any such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, 
transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the 
writing or the making, completion, execution, authentica-
tion, issuance, transference, publication or utterance pur-
ports to be the act of another, whether the person is 
existent or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed 
at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than 
was m fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when no 
such original existed 
(2) As used in this section, "writing'" includes printing, 
electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of 
recording valuable information including forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, 
trademarks, money and any other symbols of value, right, 
privilege, or identification. 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument 
or writing issued by a government or any agency; or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other 
instrument or writing representing an interest in or claim 
against property, or a pecuniary interest m or claim 
against any person or enterprise 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree 1998 
58-22-305. Exemption from licensure. 
(1) In addition to the exemptions from licensure m Section 
58-1-307, the following may engage in the stated limited acts 
or practices without being licensed under this chapter 
(a) a person offering to render professional engineer-
ing, professional structural engineering, or professional 
land surveying services in this state when not licensee 
under this chapter if the person* 
(i) holds a current and valid professional engineer, 
professional structural engineer, or professional land 
surveyor license issued b> a licensing authority rec-
ognized by rule bv the division in collaboration with 
the board, 
(u) discloses in writing to the potential client the 
fact that the professional engineer, professional 
structural engineer or professional land suneyor 
(A) is not licensed in the state, 
(B) may not provide professional engineering, 
professional structural engineering, or profes-
sional land suneying services m the state until 
licensed m the state and 
(C) that sucr. condition may cause a delay m 
the ability of :r.e professional engineer, profes-
sional structural engineer, or professional land 
surveyor to prov-de licensed services in the state, 
(in) notifies the division in writing of his intent to 
offer to render professional engineering, professional 
structural engineering, or professional land survey-
ing services in the state, and 
dv) does not prov ce professional engineering, pro-
fessional structural engineering, or professional land 
sun eying services or engage in the practice of pro-
fessional engineerr.g. professional structural engi-
neering, or professional land sun eying in this stare 
until licenced to ac so 
(b) a person preparrg a plan and specification for a 
one-, two-, three-, or fcur-family residence not exceeding 
two stones in height e xciusive of oasement, 
(c) a person licensed to practice architecture under 
Title 58, Chapter 3a. Architecture Licensing Act, perform-
ing architecture acts or incidental engineering or struc-
tural engineering pract.ces that do not exceed the scope of 
the education and r : . : j j of the person performing 
engineering or struct j ra ' ergineenng, 
fd) unlicensed emp'«\ ees subordinates, associates, or 
drafters o: a person Lcensed under this chapter while 
preparing Dlans maps sketches drawings documents 
specifications plats, ana reports under the supenision of 
a professional engineer professional structural engineer. 
or professional land Su-.evor 
le) a person preparer a plan or specification for or 
supemsmg the alteration of or repair to, an existing 
building affecting an a**ea not exceeding 3,000 square feet 
when structural elements of a building are not changed, 
such as foundations teams columns, and structural 
slabs, joists, beanng walls and trusses, 
(f) an employee of a communications, utility railroad, 
mining petroleum or manufacturing company or an 
affiliate of such a company if the professional engineering 
or professiona1 structural engineering work is performed 
solely in connection v. th the products or systems of the 
company and is not offered directly to the pubhc and 
(g) an organization engaged in the practice of profes-
sional engineering struct jral engineering, or profes-
sional land surveying provided that* 
(l) the organization employs a principal, and 
(n) all individuals employed by the organization, 
who are engaged si the practice of professional engi-
neering, structural engineering, or land sun eying, 
are licensed or exempt from licensure under this 
chapter 
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to restnet a 
draftsman from preparing plans for a client under the exemp-
tion provided in Subsection (1 <b) or taking those plans to a 
professional engineer for his rev iew approval, and suhsoque it 
fixing of the engineer < <eal to that set of plans if the\ meet ;>o 
building code standards v * 5 * 
58-3a-304. Exemptions from licensure. 
(1) In addition to the exemptions from licensure in Section 
58-1-307, the following ma> engage *n the stated limited acts 
or practices without being licensed under this chapter 
(a) a person offering to render architectural services in 
this state when not licensed under this chapter if the 
person 
(i) holds a current and \alid architect license is-
sued by a licensing authority recognized bv rule by 
the division in collaboration with the board, 
(n) discloses m writ ng to the potential client the 
fact that the architect 
(A) is not licensed in the state, 
(B) may not provide architectural services m 
the state until the architect is licensed in the 
state, and 
(C) that such condition may cause a delay in 
the ability of the architect to provide architec-
tural services in the state, 
(iii) notifies the division m writing of his intent to 
offer to render architectural services m the state, and 
(iv) does not provide architectural services or en-
gage in the practice of architecture m this state until 
licensed to do so, 
(b) a person preparing a plan and specification for a 
one, two, three, or four-family residence not exceeding two 
stones in height, exclusive of basement, 
(c) a person licensed to practice professional engineer-
ing under Title 58, Chapter 22, Professional Engineers 
and Land Surveyors Licensing Act, performing engineer-
ing or incidental architectural acts or practices that do not 
exceed the scope of the education and training of the 
person performing architecture, 
(d) unlicensed employees subordinates, associates, or 
drafters of a person licensed under this chapter while 
preparing plans and specifications under the supervision 
of an architect, 
(e) a person preparing a plan or specification for, or 
supervising the alteration of or repair to, an existing 
building affecting an area not exceeding 3,000 square feet 
when structural elements of a building are not changed, 
such as foundations, beams, columns, and structural 
slabs, joists, beanng walls, and trusses, and 
(f) an organization engaged m the practice of architec-
ture, provided that 
d) the organization employs a principal, and 
(n) all individuals employed by the organization 
who are engaged m the practice of architecture, are 
licensed or exempt from licensure under this chapter 
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to restrict a 
draftsman from preparing Dlans for a client under the exemp-
tion provided in Subsection (1Kb) or taking those plans to a 
licensed architect for his review approval, and subsequent 
fixing of the architect's seal to t h a t sec of plans if they meet the 
building code s tandards 1996 
Rule 81. Applicability of rules in general. 
(a) Special statutory proceedings These rules shall apply to 
all special statutory proceedings, except insofar as such rules 
are by their nature clearly inapplicable Where a statute 
provides for procedure by reference to any part of the former 
Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be in accordance 
with these rules 
(b) Probate and guardianship These rules shall not apply 
to proceedings in uncontested probate and guardianship mat-
ters, but shall apply to all proceedings subsequent to the 
joinder of issue therein, including the enforcement of any 
judgment or order entered 
(c) Procedure in city courts and j*~szice courts These rules 
shall apply to civil actions commenced m the city or justice 
courts, except insofar as such rules are by their nature clearh 
inapplicable to such courts or proceedings therem 
(d) On appeal from or review of z ruling or order of an 
administrative board or agency These rules shall apply to the 
practice and procedure in appealing from or obtaining a 
review of any order, ruling or other action of an administrative 
board or agency, except insofar as the specific statutory 
procedure m connection with an> sucn appeal or re\ iew is in 
conflict or inconsistent with these rules 
(e) Application in criminal proceedings These rules of 
procedure shall also govern in an> aspect of criminal proceed-
ings where there is no other applicable statute or rule, 
provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict with any 
statutory or constitutional requirement 
ADDENDUM "B 
R. Don Brown #0464 
Sevier County Attorney 
Sevier County Justice Complex 
835 East 300 North, Suite 100 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: (435) 896-2675 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, 
JUDGMENT 
vs. : 
DEREK ANDREASON, : 
DOB: Case No. 991600305FS 
Defendant. : Judge David L. Mower 
The above-captioned matter having come on for sentencing on 
November 7, 2000, pursuant to a finding of guilty with regard to the 
offense of Forgery, a Third Degree Felony; and the Court having 
entertained the arguments of R. Don Brown for the State of Utah, and of 
Donald E. McCandless, Attorney for the Defendant; and being apprised of 
no further impediment to entry of Judgment ; 
NOW THEREFORE, the Defendant is sentenced to serve a term of 
not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison, and fined in the 
amount of $9,625.00; 
Provided that execution of the prison sentence shall be stayed 
and all but $1,500.00 of the fine and surcharge suspended upon the 
completion of an eighteen month period of probation under the direction 
and control of the Department of Adult Probation and Parole; which 
probation, in addition to all normal and customary terms shall contain 
the following conditions: 
&££ 
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State of Utah vs. Derek Andreason 
1. Violate no laws. 
2. The Defendant will pay his fine and surcharge at a rate of 
not less than $100.00 per month, with all unpaid monies bearing interest 
at the State's judgment rate of 7.670 percent. 
3. The Defendant will serve sixteen days in the Sevier County 
Jail in increments of not less than forty-eight hours. 
4. The probationary period and requirement for fine payment 
shall commence upon completion of appellate review. The term for 
completion of the confinement shall be determined upon commencement of 
the probationary term. 
DATED this day of November, 2000. 
DAVTD L. MOWER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing JUDGMENT was placed in the United States mail at 
Richfield, Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid on the 
day of November, 2000, addressed as follows: 
Mr. Donald E. McCandless 
Attorney at Law 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 220 
Provo, Utah 84 6 04 
\,Wn<=v, \fc?» OEfcc 
ADDENDUM "C 
c a s e . Appreciate what y o u ' v e shown me by present ing the 
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e v i d e n c e and p o i n t i n g t h i n g s o u t t o m e . I t ' s an i n t e r e s t i n g 
c a s e . 
The f ac t s have shown t o m e , c o n v i n c e d me beyond a 
r e a s o n a b l e doubt t h a t Mr. A n d r e a s o n c o r r m i t t e d a fo rgery because 
h e u t t e r e d Exhib i t No. 1 t o S e v i e r C o u n t y , and he in tended t h a t 
t h e u t t e r a n c e be — t o h a v e b e e n e x e c u t e d a t a t ime and p l a c e 
o t h e r t h a n i n f ac t was t h e c a s e . T h e r e a s o n I reach t h a t 
c o n c l u s i o n i s because E x h i b i t N o . 1 c a n o n l y be i n t e r p r e t e d 
i n l i g h t of Exhibit, No. 3 , Mr. A r . d r e a s o n ' s a c t i o n s ta!<en i n 
r e s p o n s e to Exhib i t No. 3 . 
The c o n v i c t i o n b a s e d e n p r i o r r u l i n g s i s one count of 
f o r g e r y . The e t h e r c h a r g e s , i f c h e y h a v e r / 1 been dis~±sszd, 
t h e y a r e d ismissed b e c a u s e I ' v e b e e n i n f o r m e d by t h e p a r t i e s 
t h a t t h o s e charges have b e e n a b a n d o n e d . So t h e r e i s cr.e 
c o n v i c t i o n cf fo rge ry . 
Eefore I r ead t h e i s s u e s c f t h e t r i a l , _ I ' ve cot seme 
e x h i b i t s here which p e o p l e may wan~ . So I want to t a l k about 
e x h i b i t s . Mr. Brown, i s t h e r e a n y t h i n g i n t h e e x h i b i t s t h a t 
you want to s u b s t i t u t e a copy f o r ? 
MR. BROWN: No. 
THE COCJRT: Mr. M c C a n d l e s s ? 
MR. McCANDLESS: My o n l y c o n c e r n w i t h t he e x h i b i t s , I 
s u p p o s e , would be t h e one we a l r e a d y a d d r e s s e d wi th the c l e r k . 
T h e r e ' s no ( inaudib le ) a t t h i s t i m e . We d o n ' t have a problem 
w i t h t h a t remaining i n t h e C o u r t ' s f i l e . 
